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Non-technical summary 
This paper analyses Greek fiscal sustainability. This topic lies in the core of all discussions 
about a potential exit of the country from the euro area, and - more in general - about the 
design and long-run sustainability of the monetary union. We analyse Greek fiscal 
sustainability using empirical analysis and combine a retrospective and a prospective view. 
 In the retrospective part of the paper, econometric tests on solvency and sustainability 
of the Greek budget show that the Greek public finances were not on a sustainable path even 
before the global crisis broke out in 2009. Clearly, the ensuing economic and fiscal crisis that 
Greece experienced since that time has added additional pressure on the urge to regain fiscal 
sustainability. Thus, an important question is how Greece may regain fiscal stability. 
In a next step, we therefore set out a forward-looking scenario-analysis to investigate 
how Greek public finances may evolve during the medium and long-run. Simulations for the 
period between 2011 and 2030, using a stylised model of the Greek public finances, provide a 
number of interesting insights and policy implications.  
A first result is the importance of the interest rate versus growth factor for the 
dynamics of the fiscal variables in the longer run: a small reduction in interest rates or a small 
improvement of growth delivers important gains in limiting or even preventing the “debt 
snowball” effect that we still observe quite significantly in a status quo baseline scenario. 
Given that interest rates and economic growth are only very indirectly under control of 
policymakers, regaining long-run sustainability will require a long period of fiscal 
consolidation, resulting in substantial expenditure reductions with accompanying economic, 
political and social costs. Furthermore, fiscal prudence requires being very cautious regarding 
projections on interest rates and growth, and considering the possibility that both interest rates 
could get higher than projected and growth rates lower than expected. 
In a “best case” scenario, the fiscal consolidation is significantly supported by growth, 
interest and primary balance improvements. At the same time, a “worst case” scenario where 
all these parameters turn adverse, imply a rapid derailment of Greek public finance and most 
likely a rapid default in practical terms. Debt-restructuring and debt forgiveness may have 
beneficial effects in the short-run; these effects are, however, temporary if not at the same 
time also the underlying structural determinants of fiscal sustainability are changed.  
A final simulation points to the importance of the risk-premia dynamics in 
sustainability of public finances. A scenario where this risk-premia disappears (or is largely 
reduced) would provide strong support to fiscal sustainability as it mitigates the non-trivial 
adverse impact of speculation in international bond markets about a Greek default. 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
Die Studie analysiert die Tragfähigkeit griechischer Staatsfinanzen, deren Krise im 
Mittelpunkt der Diskussionen um den Austritt des Landes aus der Eurozone und die generelle 
Debatte um die Ausgestaltung und den Zusammenhalt in der Währungsunion steht.  
Auf Grundlage von ökonometrischen Tests wird im ersten Teil der Studie dargelegt, 
dass bereits vor dem Jahr 2009 die Solidität der öffentlichen Finanzen in Griechenland stark 
anzuzweifeln war. Seit Ausbruch der Wirtschafts- und Fiskalkrise hat sich die Situation für 
Griechenland weiter dramatisch verschlechtert und zusätzlichen Druck zur Herstellung 
fiskalischer Tragfähigkeit aufgebaut. Es stellt sich daher die Frage, unter welchen 
Voraussetzungen Griechenland mittel- bis langfristig wieder zu einem solventen Staat werden 
kann. Um dafür Orientierung zu geben, werden im zweiten Teil der Studie verschiedene 
Simulationen auf Grundlage eines stilisierten Modells zur Entwicklung der öffentlichen 
Finanzen in Griechenland  über die Jahre 2011 und 2030 durchgeführt.  
Ein Ergebnis verweist auf die hohe Sensitivität der fiskalischen Schlüsselgrößen 
bezüglich des Wirtschaftswachstums und der Schuldenzinsen: Eine nur leichte Reduktion der 
Zinsen oder ein etwas höheres Wachstum des Bruttoinlandsprodukts als im Basisszenario 
unterstellt bringt entscheidende Vorteile und hilft, den schuldenstandserhöhenden 
"Schneeballeffekt" zu vermeiden. Dieser Schnellballeffekt gewinnt im Basisszenario, welches 
auf Status quo Annahmen baut und die Ausgangsreferenz der Simulationen darstellt, schnell 
die Überhand und würde zu einem unvermeidbaren Kollaps der öffentlichen Finanzen führen. 
Da die Stellgrößen „Wachstum“ und „Schuldenzinsen“ nur bedingt der direkten politischen 
Steuerung unterliegen, kann  die Herstellung der langfristigen fiskalischen Tragfähigkeit nur 
an einer aktiven Haushaltskonsolidierung ansetzen, verbunden durch eine starke Reduktion 
der Staatsausgaben. Außerdem sollten für die Planungen des künftigen Staatshaushalts 
vorsichtige Projektionen zugrunde gelegt werden und berücksichtigt werden, dass kleine 
Wachstums- und Zinsänderungen große Auswirkungen auf den Schuldenstand und den 
Schuldendienst haben werden. 
Erreichbar wäre die mittel- bis langfristige Sanierung des Haushalts über eine günstige 
Zinsentwicklung, einem etwas stärkeren Wirtschaftswachstum als im Basisszenario sowie 
einem dauerhaften Überschuss des Primärsaldos. Darauf deuten unsere Ergebnisse eines 
„Best case“-Szenarios. Im „Worst case“-Szenario hingegen, welches eine simultane 
Verschlechterung dieser Faktoren unterstellt, wäre ein rascher Staatsbankrott unvermeidbar. 
Ein einmaliger Schuldenerlass hätte lediglich einen kurzfristigen Effekt und würde ohne 
weitere Konsolidierungsmaßnahmen die negative Dynamik der Staatsfinanzen zwar 
verzögern, aber langfristig nicht aufhalten. 
In einer letzten Simulation betrachten wir die fiskalischen Wirkungen von 
Risikoaufschlägen auf die Schuldenzinsen griechischer Staatsanleihen. Ein Wegfallen 
spekulativer Elemente der Risikoprämien würde die Schuldenfinanzierung erleichtern und 
eine vollständige Reduktion der Risikoaufschläge würde sogar substanziell helfen, den 
griechischen Staatshaushalt langfristig auf einen tragfähigen Pfad zu bringen. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Despite its relatively small size in the total euro area economy, economic and budgetary 
developments in Greece have played a major role in the euro area since 2009 when first signs 
of significant fiscal and macroeconomic challenges surfaced.2 Since the beginning of 2010, 
global capital markets have sounded the alarm about the situation in Greece: increasing 
interest rate spreads on Greek bonds relative to German bonds and increasing spreads on 
Greek Credit Default Swaps (CDS) signalled diminishing investor confidence. On May 2 
2010, Euro finance ministers, IMF and the Greek government agreed on a 110 billion euro 
rescue package for Greece -80 billion euro comes from the EU and 30 billion euro from the 
IMF- and supporting economic policies.3 The former Greek Prime Minister George 
Papandreou announced that Greece will cut 30 billion euro in spending over the next three 
years. Greek bond prices recovered somewhat on this announcement, but this recovery was 
short-lived. 
 As a result of the continuing tensions and speculations about difficulties in Greece, as 
well as Portugal, Ireland and Spain, European Union finance ministers met in a 14 hour 
session in the weekend of May 8 and 9, 2010, and agreed on a 750 billion euro European-
wide rescue package. The IMF was also involved again and the ECB announced to buy 
European public and private debt. Greek bond prices increased substantially on this 
announcement. 
 The continuing fiscal turmoil and social unrest in Greece, combined with continuing 
speculation in financial markets of a pending Greek default -with or without an exit from the 
Eurozone- led to a repeated downgrading of Greek government credit ratings by rating 
agencies to “junk status”. Risk premia on Greek debt and implied default probabilities in 
credit default swaps rose again. As a result, a further rescue program followed in July 2011 
focusing on rescheduling of debt obligations and public and private debt-buyback schemes 
which taken together imply a significant reduction of the Greek debt burden in the shorter and 
longer run. Taken together, banks would accept a 21% “haircut” on their Greek debt holdings. 
 Notwithstanding these efforts, speculation about a Greek default continued. An extra 
Euro area summit on October 26 proposed new measures to support Greece and extend the 
EFSF to support banks that would be affected by the Greek debt problem, in an attempt to 
prevent further contagion of the Greek debt problem to other euro area countries. Banks 
would accept a 50% “haircut” on their Greek debt holdings. At the political front, the Greek 
government and its Prime Minister resigned to make way for a technocratic government that 
is to prevent further political stalemate in the implementation of structural reform and fiscal 
consolidation measures in the line of the EU/IMF proposals accompanying the rescue 
packages. 
 Whether or not the emergency measures constitute a “credit event”, de facto Greece 
has until so far not defaulted on its debt obligations, and its government has repeatedly vowed 
that budgetary and structural reforms will be implemented: These reforms are intended to 
restore long-run budgetary sustainability and economic growth, and thereby will support 
confidence in the viability of a Greek participation in the euro area.  
                                                 
2 The IMF (2009) e.g. noted in July 2009 on the Greek situation “Fiscal and external imbalances are high and 
competitiveness has weakened. Fiscal consolidation cannot be postponed. Reforms to bolster competitiveness 
and growth are essential to avoid slipping into stagnation. Greece needs a coherent fiscal adjustment path, based 
on durable measures, aimed at returning the debt ratio to a downward trajectory. Revenue enhancements are 
needed, but the main tasks are to address the wage bill and structurally worsening entitlement programs.” 
3 See EU Commission (2010a) for all details of the Greek adjustment program. 
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 While not being a large euro area country, the interest and importance in the Greek 
case lies in the potential role of bond market contagion to other euro area countries, and 
related, the design and long-run sustainability of the euro area. Both issues have received 
ample speculation from policymakers and in financial markets. 
 This paper analyses Greek fiscal sustainability since it lies in the core of all 
discussions. Financial analysts and policymakers have made many claims about Greek fiscal 
sustainability and alternative solutions to improve it were proposed. We analyse Greek fiscal 
sustainability using empirical analysis and combine a retrospective and a prospective analysis. 
In the retrospective analysis in Section 2, econometric testing of Greek government solvency 
during the period from 1980 to 2008 is undertaken to assess fiscal sustainability during this 
period. In the prospective Section 3, a scenario analysis of budgetary adjustment in the 
medium- and long-run under alternative hypotheses is carried out. It considers the impact of 
deficit reduction, growth (e.g. resulting a pervasive restructuring and structural reform in the 
Greek economy), interest rate, debt restructuring (relating to the ‘haircuts’ on Greek debt), 
and financial market pressure. The final section discusses perspectives on how to regain long-
run budget sustainability in Greece, given the results of the analytical parts. 
 
2 Budgetary (un)sustainability in Greece: Empirical testing 
Past budgetary and macroeconomic trends 
Figure 1 summarizes the main budgetary and macroeconomic trends that are observed during 
the period from 1990 to 2010. All data are from the European Commission’s AMECO 
database.4 While being not very favourable already before, fiscal variables significantly 
deteriorate from 2007 onwards. Also the macroeconomic balance between growth and interest 
rate deteriorates around the same time. Both factors contribute to a rapid increasing 
government debt to GDP ratio, reflecting the ‘snow-ball’ effect. Underlying the fiscal balance 
deterioration is a combination of increasing government spending and declining revenues. We 
do not go into greater details of Figure 1 at this point (concepts will be discussed in due 
course), but rather point to the fact that the clear period of fiscal slippage from 2007 onwards 
is visible in nearly all fiscal and macroeconomic indicators.  
 
                                                 
4 Greek fiscal data and national income data have met repeated criticism on their consistency and adequacy. The 
European Commission (2010b) summarises the main problems and recommendations for improvement. We take 
the AMECO data as representing a reasonably adequate approximation of the actual Greek fiscal variables and 
output. 
3 
 
80
100
120
140
160
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Government debt (% GDP)
-14
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Fiscal balance (% GDP)
6
8
10
12
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Interest payments (% GDP)
-8
-4
0
4
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Primary fiscal balance (% GDP)
20
24
28
32
36
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Financing requirement (% GDP)
-15
-10
-5
0
5
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Primary fiscal balance gap (% GDP)
0
4
8
12
16
20
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Nominal GDP growth rate (%)
5
10
15
20
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Long term interest rate (%)
4
8
12
16
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Risk premium (%)
-4
0
4
8
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Interest rate-growth differential (%)
32
36
40
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Government revenue (% GDP)
36
40
44
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Primary government expenditure (% GDP)
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Real GDP growth rate (%)
5
10
15
20
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Inflation rate (%)
0
2
4
6
8
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Real interest rate (%)
 
 
Figure 1: Fiscal and macroeconomic variables, Greece, 1990-2010. Source: AMECO 
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Sustainability of the Greek budget before the crisis 
Unsustainable public finance, viz. government insolvency, implies the violation of the no-
Ponzi game condition and hence, the intertemporal budget constraint. Following Bohn’s 
seminal work (Bohn, 1995), empirical studies on government solvency have focused on 
estimating stationarity of fiscal balances and on finding cointegration between debt and the 
primary fiscal balance. Other studies such as Afonso (2005) apply the test of cointegration 
between government revenues and government expenditures in order to examine the 
sustainability hypothesis.  
 To test whether the Greek budget was sustainable before the fiscal crisis in 2009, we 
first conduct unit root tests on government gross debt, (primary) fiscal balances, government 
spending and government revenue. 
 
Table 1: Unit root tests 
 Deterministics ADF DF-GLS 
Government gross debt None 2.42 (0.99)  
 Intercept -2.06 (0.26) -0.26 
 Intercept and trend -1.26 (0.88) -1.22 
Fiscal balance None -0.59 (0.45)  
 Intercept -1.43 (0.55) -1.39 
 Intercept and trend -0.94 (0.94 -1.34 
Primary balance None -1.22 (0.20)  
 Intercept -1.18 ( 0.66) -1.16 
 Intercept and trend -1.05 (0.91) -1.12 
Δ Primary balance None -1.42 (0.14)  
 Intercept -1.23 (0.64) -1.61 
 Intercept and trend -2.35 (0.39) -2.16 
Government spending None 1.66 (0.97)  
 Intercept 0.61 (0.99) -0.16 
 Intercept and trend -1.57 (0.76) -1.92 
Government revenue None 1.19 (0.93)  
 Intercept -3.17 (0.04) -1.61 
 Intercept and trend -0.90 (0.94) -1.01 
Sample: 1989-2008, for the ADF test p-values in parenthesis. Critical values for 
the DF-GLS test: -2.75, -1.97, -1.60 at the 1%, 5%, 10% level (intercept case) 
and -3.77, -3.19, -2.89 at the 1%, 5%, 10% level (intercept and trend case)   
 
Government debt, total fiscal deficit, primary fiscal deficit, government spending and 
government revenues are all non-stationary in the sample period from 1989 to 2008 (Table 1). 
Even the change in the primary fiscal balance is found to be non-stationary during this period. 
That none of the tests rejects the null of a unit root in the (primary) fiscal balance is a first 
indication that intertemporal budget balance was not ensured in Greece even before the fiscal 
that erupted in 2009. 
 If the expected real interest rate is constant, for intertemporal budget balance to hold, 
the stock of debt and the primary deficit need to cointegrate (Trehan and Wlash, 1991). To 
test for such a cointegrating relation between debt and primary deficit in the Greek case, we 
applied both the Johansen procedure –results provided in Table 2- and the Engle-Granger 
single equation cointegration tests for equations with different deterministic components -
results are provided in Table 3. 
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Table 2: Johansen cointegration test on Greek primary deficit and debt 
Data Trend None None Linear Linear Quadratic 
Test Type No Intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept 
 No Trend No Trend No Trend Trend Trend 
Trace 0 0 0 0 0 
Max-Eig 0 0 0 0 0 
*Critical values based on MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) 
 
 
Table 3: Engle-Granger cointegration test on Greek primary deficit and debt 
Cointegrating equation deterministics: Constant  
Dependent tau-statistic Prob.* z-statistic Prob.* 
Government debt -1.253965 0.8454 -3.432253 0.8408 
Primary balance -0.841305 0.9283 -3.006412 0.8729 
Cointegrating equation deterministics: Constant and trend 
Dependent tau-statistic Prob.* z-statistic Prob.* 
Government debt -3.372585 0.2087 -14.96438 0.1881 
Primary balance -2.648573 0.4953 -12.89425 0.3125 
Cointegrating equation deterministics: Constant, trend and quadratic trend 
Dependent tau-statistic Prob.* z-statistic Prob.* 
Government debt -2.752421 0.6830 -12.24238 0.6119 
Primary balance -4.363916 0.1106 -18.57582 0.1614 
*MacKinnon (1996) p-values, automatic lags specification based on Schwarz criterion 
 
We do not find a cointegration relationship between the primary budget balance and the stock 
of debt. Trehan and Walsh (1991) show that the cointegration tests on government solvency 
do not generalize to the case where the expected real rate of interest is allowed to vary. Time-
variation of interest rate expectations is likely given that the Greek economy underwent 
changes by preparing for the adaption of the Euro and implementing several convergence and 
stabilization programs that aimed at integrating into the European Monetary Union. A test of 
budget sustainability that rests on the assumption of a constant expected real interest rate may 
therefore be not very powerful. However, Trehan and Walsh (1991) argue that stationarity of 
the inclusive-of-interest deficit - the fiscal budget balance - is sufficient to imply that 
intertemporal budget balance holds, as long as the expected real rate of interest is positive. 
 Another prerequisite for a sustained budget is that revenues and expenditures move in 
parallel in the long-run. Only deviations of revenues from expenditures that are not mean-
reverting violate restrictions on a sustainable budget balance. Consequently, if the budget 
process is balanced in the long-run, we expect revenues and expenditures being cointegrated. 
 Table 1 provided unit root tests of total expenditures (excluding interest payments) 
and total revenue. Both variables are non-stationary so that we indeed need to check whether 
a stationary linear combination between expenditures and revenues exist. Table 4 reports 
results of Johansen’s cointegration test and Table 5 outcomes of the Engle-Granger 
cointegration test. The null of no cointegration is rejected by Johansen’s trace and maximum 
eigenvalue statistic in almost all cases. The Engel-Granger procedure also rejects 
cointegration except in the very special case when a quadratic deterministic trend is included 
in the cointegration equation. We present outcomes for this specification for the sake of 
completeness, although the presence of a quadratic trend in the cointegration equation lacks 
any economic rationale and surely would not point to a healthy budget process in the long-
run. We overall conclude that governmental revenues and expenditures in Greece did not co-
move prior to the crisis in 2009. This finding implies non-sustainability of the Greek budget 
and confirms again the earlier finding using budget balance and debt stock data.  
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Table 4: Johansen cointegration test of revenues and expenditures 
Data Trend: None None Linear Linear Quadratic 
Test Type No Intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept 
 No Trend No Trend No Trend Trend Trend 
Trace 0 1 0 0 0 
Max-Eig 0 0 0 0 0 
*Critical values based on MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) 
 
Table 5: Engle-Granger cointegration test of government revenues and spending 
Cointegrating equation deterministics: Constant  
Dependent tau-statistic Prob.* z-statistic Prob.* 
Govnt. spending -0.565618 0.9590 -1.932556 0.9360 
Govnt.revenues -1.482438 0.7711 -3.421505 0.8416 
Cointegrating equation deterministics: Constant and trend 
Dependent tau-statistic Prob.* z-statistic Prob.* 
Govnt. spending -3.261304 0.2433 -15.54340 0.1606 
Govnt. revenues -1.716555 0.8879 -4.982806 0.9264 
Cointegrating equation deterministics: Constant, trend and quadratic trend 
Dependent tau-statistic Prob.* z-statistic Prob.* 
Govnt. spending -4.088150 0.1640 -18.48348 0.1657 
Govnt.revenues -3.039170 0.5571 -57.47535 0.0001 
*MacKinnon (1996) p-values, automatic lags specification based on Schwarz criterion 
 
Taken together, the unit-root and cointegration tests point strongly to unsustainability of 
Greek public finances during the period between 1989 and 2008. Clearly, the ensuing 
economic and fiscal crisis that Greece experienced has added additional pressure on the urge 
to regain fiscal sustainability. An important question is therefore how Greece may regain 
fiscal stability. 
 
3 A forward-looking approach to fiscal sustainability in Greece: 
Simulating alternative scenarios for 2011-2030 
Fiscal sustainability can not only be defined in terms of observed behaviour of fiscal deficits, 
debt, expenditures and revenues in the past, but also in terms of a forward-looking approach 
by considering alternative scenarios for the near future and beyond and assess their 
implications in terms of budgetary sustainability. In this section, we analyse a number of 
budgetary scenarios that could be relevant from the perspective of sustainability of Greek 
consolidated public finances. 
 Underlying our analysis is a small simulation model that can be summarised by the 
equations that are shown in Table 6.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 Our model deals with the general government fiscal variables and is therefore not further worked out into 
federal, regional, local government and social security accounts. 
7 
 
Table 6: A small model of Greek public finances 
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Equation (1) determines the dynamics of the next period debt-to-GDP ratio (B/Y) as a result of 
debt in the previous period, the deficit to GDP ratio (D/Y), the nominal GDP growth rate (grn) 
and the stock-flow adjustment (SF/Y). The stock-flow adjustment is the difference between 
the change in government debt and the government deficit/surplus for a given period. Stock-
flow adjustments occur, for instance, through an acquisition of financial assets. The deficit in 
equation (2) equals revenues to GDP (T/Y) minus expenditures to GDP (G/Y). Total 
expenditures in equation (3) consist of primary expenditures (GP/Y) and interest expenditures 
(int). Equation (4) defines the primary fiscal balance (DP/Y) by taking out the interest 
payments from the total deficit. Interest payments are approximated by the interest rate at the 
average maturity of the outstanding debt, iavg. The nominal interest rate in equation (6) is 
defined as the sum of the real average interest rate (ravg), (expected) average inflation (πavg) 
and a risk premium (rpavg), all defined at the average maturity.6  
 We assume in equation (7) that the risk premium depends on the average financing 
requirement (finreqavg), with the sensitivity measured by the curvature parameter α. The 
financing requirement is proxied by the fiscal deficit plus the amount of debt divided by the 
average maturity (avg). Debt financed at a longer maturity has the advantage of reducing the 
financing requirement compared to debt with a shorter maturity. At the same time, financial 
markets typically increase the risk premium with longer maturity of bonds as the risk of 
default and interest rate changes increases with a longer maturity, the term premium. Note 
that equations (7), (6), (5) and (1) imply a non linearity (i.e. quadratic) in the debt dynamics.  
                                                 
6 This implies that in the short-run interest payments are largely determined by past interest rates (given a debt 
evolution) and less by current market conditions bond yields, current speculations in financial markets, etc. The 
current interest rate at the average interest (6) is a somewhat rough proxy for the average interest rate on 
outstanding debt. In our simulations these current conditions and future expectations, speculations embedded in 
market interest rates, do need to get more attention as they will be gradually factored into future dynamics of 
interest payments as debt is rolled over. 
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 Nominal GDP growth in equation (8) equals real growth (gr) plus inflation.7 Finally, 
equation (9) gives the primary fiscal gap (pfgap), the difference between the primary fiscal 
balance that would stabilize debt at the level at the start of the current period and the actual 
primary fiscal balance.  
The baseline scenario 
We firstly set out a baseline scenario for the exogenous variables in the model for the period 
from 2011 to 2030 and then analyse the consequences for budgetary sustainability of several 
alternative scenarios. While this baseline scenario should not be considered necessarily as the 
most likely one, we give it a number of features that could be a useful benchmark.  
 In the baseline, we assume a real GDP growth rate of 1.25%, an inflation rate of 2% 
and a real interest rate of 1%. Primary government expenditures and government revenues are 
both set to 41% of GDP- close to their 2009-2010 values- implying a primary balance in 
equilibrium. In other words, we take a neutral stance on this aspect.8 The average maturity of 
debt, avg, is set equal to its 2010 value of 6 years. The risk premium curvature coefficient α is 
set to 0.07, based on a simple regression of the Greek interest rate differential w.r.t. Germany 
on the level of Greek debt. The stock-flow adjustment is set to 0% of GDP.  
 Simulating the model with these baseline assumptions results in the adjustments that 
are shown with a blue line in Figure 2. In this baseline scenario, government debt gradually 
rises from the starting value of close to 140% of GDP to over 250% by 2030. This growth is 
driven by a rising interest burden that contributes to deteriorating fiscal conditions –increasing 
debt, deficits, and risk premium. An average primary fiscal balance gap of around -5.5% of 
GDP over the projections from 2011 to 2030 suggests that throughout the period a sustained 
primary fiscal balance (improvement) of 5.5% -compared to the baseline- is needed to 
stabilise debt at its current level, other things being equal. That means that a primary fiscal 
surplus of 5.5% more than our (optimistic) baseline assumption of a 0% primary fiscal 
balance is necessary to retain sustainable debt levels. The persistent and rising risk premium 
to a value of around 4% at the end of 2030 reflects of course the high initial debt level and 
unfavourable debt dynamics.  
Primary fiscal balance scenarios 
In the first case we consider the effects of a 1% GDP change in (net) government spending. 
Containing government spending, viz. raising tax revenues, improves the primary fiscal 
balance and has been advocated as crucial in regaining fiscal sustainability in Greece. 
Scenario 1 (2) therefore analyses the effects of a 1% decrease (increase) in primary 
government spending on the fiscal variables. Figure 2 compares the outcomes of scenario 1 
(2) and the baseline scenario. 
 
 
                                                 
7 Note that our simple model ignores the effects of changes of government spending and government revenues 
on economic growth and inflation. There is considerable uncertainty about the size and even the sign of fiscal 
multipliers (think of the literature on the so-called non-Keynesian effects of fiscal adjustments) in the short and 
long-run, see Spilimbergo (2008). 
8 An example of more pessimistic baseline on the primary fiscal balance (-2% for the period 2010-2014) is taken 
by the IMF (2009). IMF (2010) considers an alternative, more optimistic scenario with the primary fiscal balance 
gradually improving from -2.5% of GDP in 2010 to +5% of GDP in 2015. In the even more optimistic scenarios 
of the European Commission (2010c), a positive primary fiscal balance of 5.5% of GDP is assumed from 2011 
onwards, resulting in a gradual debt reduction from137% to 125% to GDP in 2025. 
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Figure 2: Simulation of 1% lower (Scenario 1, red dashed line) or higher (Scenario 2, 
green dotted line) primary government spending compared to baseline (blue line), 2011-
2030 
 
This scenario illustrates the relatively high sensitivity –especially in a longer-run perspective- 
of the Greek budgetary situation to small, permanent changes in the primary balance. 
Compared to the baseline, all fiscal variables gradually improve (deteriorate) from a reduction 
(increase) in primary government spending. Conversely, in case of a primary fiscal balance 
deterioration, fiscal sustainability is out-of-reach definitively. The simulation points in a 
quantitative manner to the obvious conclusion that cutting spending and/or increasing 
revenue, e.g. by reducing tax-evasion, is not easy and subject to political social resistance, but 
an important prerequisite for regaining fiscal sustainability in the Greek case. 
 Note that our simple framework ignores the effects that changes in government 
spending (and government revenue) may have on economic growth and inflation. Most 
empirical studies would point to small but positive fiscal multipliers in the short-run. The 
literature on non-Keynesian effects of fiscal adjustments would, however, point to the 
possibility of positive growth effects from fiscal consolidations –citing positive wealth 
effects, positive expectations effects and positive incentive effects-, especially under 
conditions of high government debt and high tax rates, a situation that would apply to the case 
of Greece. Taken together, this suggests that the short-run and long-run growth effects of such 
a fiscal consolidation are -while perhaps not zero- rather limited. 
Growth scenarios 
 In the second case depicted in Figure 3, the effects of a 1% change in economic 
growth is considered: a crucial factor since economic growth determines the tax bases from 
which government spending, deficits and debt can be financed. Uncertainty over economic 
growth in the short and long-run is typically high. Thus, the following scenarios highlight the 
importance of assessing the impact of alternative growth hypotheses on public finances. 
Indeed, the Greek government has announced -and is seeking- to implement various measures 
that could contribute to reinvigorating growth of the Greek economy by restructuring and 
modernising the private and public sectors. Scenario 3 (4) displays the effects of an 
improvement (deterioration) of the real growth rate of 1% compared to the baseline.  
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Figure 3: Simulation of 1% higher (Scenario 3, green dotted line) and 1% lower 
(Scenario 4, red dashed line) economic growth compared to baseline (blue line), 2011-
2030 
A small but sustained improvement of economic growth has strong effects on public finances. 
Compared to the baseline, debt dynamics get on a declining path and all fiscal variables 
improve markedly.  
Interest rate scenarios  
In the third case, the effects of a 1% change in the interest rate (risk premium) are analysed. 
We implement this interest rate shock by a change in the real interest rate, r. The same 
outcomes and interpretations would result if we implement the interest rate shock as a 1% 
shock to the risk premium. While economic growth is a stabilising factor, interest rates are a 
destabilising element in debt to GDP dynamics. The interest rate (risk premium) is obviously 
also one of the crucial driving forces in the dynamics of the Greek debt to GDP ratio. A 
higher interest rate (risk premium) not only implies a higher interest burden on outstanding 
debt, but we also consider the possibility that a higher debt stock itself in addition induces an 
increasing risk premium on government debt, leading to higher interest rates and reinforcing 
therefore the instability from high, increasing debt. Scenario 5 (6) considers the effects of a 
1% lower (higher) interest rate on Greek debt, compared to the baseline.  
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Figure 4: Simulation a 1% lower (Scenario 5, green dotted lines) and 1% higher 
(Scenario 6, red dashed lines) real interest rate compared to baseline (blue line), 2011-
2030 
 
The results are similar to the 1% economic growth changes shown in Figure 3, the main 
differences lie of course in the interest burden and total deficit adjustment. A reduction of 
interest rates in Greek debt - whatever way achieved- is a crucial prerequisite for a lasting 
fiscal consolidation to be feasible. Note that the outcomes of the scenarios of Figure 4 would 
also occur from a permanent 1% reduction (increase) of the risk premium. 
Combined government spending, growth and interest rate scenarios 
In the fourth case we consider “best” (“worst”) case scenario that bring together the previous 
three cases, a 1% primary balance improvement (deterioration), 1% higher (lower) economic 
growth and a 1% lower (higher) interest rate. Figure 5 considers such a “best case” (Scenario 
7) and a “worst case” (Scenario 8).  
The “best case” scenario essentially restores Greek fiscal sustainability, even at a slow 
pace. The fiscal balance improves gradually as the interest burden recedes. Government debt 
starts to decline. In the “worst case” scenario, a rapid further decline in fiscal sustainability 
occurs. Note in particular the asymmetry between both cases due to the non-linearity in the 
risk-premium: in the “worst case” scenario, fiscal variables deteriorate faster than they 
improve in the “best-case” scenario. 
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Figure 5: Simulation of a “best case” (Scenario 7, green dotted lines) and “worst case” 
scenario (Scenario 8, red dashed lines) compared to baseline (blue line), 2011-2030 
Debt restructuring scenarios 
Other important factors that could contribute to the alleviation of the Greek debt crisis are 
measures to restructure debt. (In)voluntary debt forgiveness, increasing the maturity and 
refinancing at advantageous interest rates all contribute to a reduction of the debt and interest 
burden. Many variants of such debt restructuring packages have been discussed and proposed. 
Figure 6 studies the effects of a stock-flow adjustment of -25% of GDP (scenario 9) that could 
be considered as a rough approximation of the effects of the substantial Greek debt-
rescheduling incorporated in the second rescue-package of July 2011. We also include a 
second, larger scenario of -40% debt to GDP (scenario 10) that could be considered as a 
rough approximation of the second Greek debt “haircut” agreed in the rescue package of 
October 27 and which would strip roughly 100 billion euro from the Greek debt where 
commercial banks would agree to write-off 50% of their Greek debt holdings. 
In case of such a one-time debt-reducing effort from rescheduling/debt-buybacks and 
other measures in the order of 25% or even 40% of GDP, Greek public finances regain a more 
stable adjustment path over time, even if in the long-run again a small upward trend in debt 
remains, as the structural problem of low growth and insufficient fiscal stringency is not 
tackled by a one-time debt-relief. Nevertheless, considerably more budgetary “breath space” 
is provided from these debt-relief scenarios.9 
 
 
                                                 
9 We ignore the possibility that financial markets, after a debt “haircut”, are likely to punish governments. 
Empirical evidence in Cruces and Trebesch (2011) suggests that higher haircuts are associated with higher 
subsequent bond yield spreads and limited capital market access for some time and that credit markets do not 
easily “forgive and forget” in other words. 
13 
 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
Government debt (% GDP)
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
Fiscal balance (%GDP)
0
4
8
12
16
20
24
2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
Interest payments (%GDP)
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
Primary fiscal balance (%GDP)
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
Primary fiscal balance gap (% GDP)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
Risk premium (%)
 
 
Figure 6: Simulation of a -25% GDP (Scenario 9, green dotted line) and -40% GDP 
(Scenario 10, red dashed line) stock-flow adjustment compared to baseline (blue line), 
2011-2030 
Risk premium scenarios 
In the last case we consider the effects of a stronger versus a lower risk-premium mechanism; 
the case of a lower risk premium mechanism is linked to the recent discussion of the possible 
introduction of ‘Eurobonds’ to stem the European debt crisis. As noted at various places, the 
risk-premium formation and dynamics play a significant role in the adjustment of fiscal 
variables. It is therefore interesting to examine this role further. We compare in Figure 7 the 
baseline scenario –based on the nonlinear (i.e. quadratic, as can be seen when combining 
equations (1), (5), (6) and (7)) risk premium mechanism, with α = 0.07- with two alternatives. 
In Scenario 11, α equals 0 implying no risk premium on Greek government bonds; in 
Scenario 12, α equals 0.1 implying a stronger non-linearity in the risk-premium, and 
consequently in the entire adjustment of fiscal variables. 
This scenario where risk-premia on Greek debt would disappear could result from the 
introduction of the so-called Eurobonds, a possibility that has been widely discussed. Figure 7 
shows that this ‘Eurobonds’ scenario would restore fiscal sustainability: debt, fiscal deficit 
and the interest burden are stabilised and the primary fiscal gap closes entirely. The scenario 
where the link between risk-premia and government debt is tightened (α = 0.1) could be 
interpreted as a headwind scenario with stronger speculation on a Greek default in 
international financial markets10, speculative downgradings of Greek debt by rating agencies 
and a general lack of confidence on the Greek efforts to restructure public finance and the 
economy. This scenario with its stronger non-linearity in public finances from the risk-premia 
effect results in a situation where a Greek default is practically inevitable in the medium-term 
when this non-linearity start to “bite” more strongly than in the baseline. 
 
                                                 
10 Such speculations can be fed e.g. by massive buying of Credit Default Swaps (CDS) on Greek debt. 
Instruments that have been described as “financial weapons of mass destruction”. While not necessarily fully 
adequate in case of sovereign debt, spreads on CDS are often used to derive an implied default probability and 
recovery rate, see Berndt e.a (2005) on such valuations using CDS. Arghyroua and Kontonikas (2011) analyse 
determinants of risk premia and CDS spreads in the Eurozone in the running-up and during the European debt 
crisis. 
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Figure 7: Simulation of α = 0 (Scenario 11, green dotted line) and α = 0.1 (Scenario 12, 
red dashed line) compared to baseline (blue line), 2011-2030 
 
4 Conclusions 
Recently, Greece found itself in the centre of the European debt crisis feeding speculations of 
a pending Greek sovereign default and an exit from the euro area. Policymakers of the 
European Union and the IMF responded by designing a Greek rescue programme to avert 
such a “worst-case scenario” on the near- and medium-term. Greek policymakers committed 
themselves to an extensive programme of fiscal and structural reforms. Given high 
vulnerabilities in growth, public finances and the financial sector, Greek policies need in 
particular to restore confidence and bolster sustainability.  
 This paper provided a more detailed look at the stability of public finance in Greece. 
Econometric tests on solvency showed that the Greek public finances were not on a 
sustainable path during the period between 1989 and 2008. During the period from 1990 to 
2010, all Greek fiscal variables were found to be non-stationary and no cointegration was 
found between public debt and the primary fiscal balance and not between government 
revenue and (non-interest) government spending.  
In a forward-looking scenario-analysis it was in a next step investigated how Greek 
public finances may evolve during the short- and medium-run. Simulations for the period 
between 2011 and 2030, using a simple model of the Greek public finances, provided a 
number of interesting insights and policy implications. A first result is the importance of the 
interest rate versus growth factor for the dynamics of the fiscal variables in the longer run: a 
small reduction in interest rate or a small improvement of growth delivers important gains in 
limiting or even preventing the “debt snowball” effect we still observe quite significantly in 
the baseline scenario. Given that interest rates and economic growth are only very indirectly 
under control of policymakers, fiscal prudence requires being very cautious regarding 
projections on interest rates and growth, and considering the possibility that both interest rates 
could get higher than projected and growth rates lower than expected.  
 Regaining long-run sustainability, in other words, will require a long period of fiscal 
consolidation, resulting in substantial expenditure reduction with accompanying economic, 
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political and social costs. In a “best case” scenario, the fiscal consolidation is significantly 
supported by growth and interest improvements and a significant debt-rescheduling package. 
At the same time, a “worst case” scenario where all these parameters turn adverse, imply a 
rapid derailment of Greek public finance and most likely a rapid default in practical terms. 
Debt-restructuring and debt forgiveness may have beneficial effects in the short-run; these 
effects are however temporary if not at the same time also the underlying structural 
determinants of fiscal sustainability are changed. A final simulation pointed to the importance 
of the risk-premia dynamics in sustainability of public finances. A scenario where this risk-
premia disappears (or is largely reduced), for instance achieved through the implementation of 
“Eurobonds”, would provide strong support to fiscal sustainability as it mitigates the non-
trivial adverse impact of speculation in international bond markets about a Greek default. 
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